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Perspective, Convention and Compromise 
 
§1 The Issue 
What is special about picturing in perspective? The question needs clarifying. In one sense, 
all picturing is perspectival, for there can be no depiction which is not from some point, or 
points, of view. In another sense, only some pictures are perspectival, or in perspective. In 
this sense, perspectival pictures are those conforming to the rules of some set of drawing 
systems. This is the sense relevant here, but it is hard to clarify satisfactorily. One thing is 
clear: the required conformity is not historical. It matters not how the picture was actually 
produced, but whether the finished product has the features the rules prescribe. The unclarity 
lies in just which drawing systems are the relevant ones, and what, if anything, unites them as 
a group. I will try to proceed without addressing these issues, returning to them only at the 
close. 
 
Unfortunately, even granting this omission does not leave our question clear. What sort of 
'specialness' is at stake? Enthusiasts and sceptics about perspective sometimes frame the issue 
between them as whether or not perspectival picturing has a special 'authority' or 'unique 
validity' (Hyman 1992), but what does this mean? We can make some progress by appeal to 
the idea of convention, provided we give that notion a clear content. As I will use the term, 
for a practice to be conventional is for it to be one of two or more equally good solutions to a 
problem, all of which are available to a given community, which is adopted by each member 
of that community simply because it is adopted by the others, it being common knowledge 
that this is so.1 In order to apply this notion to the matter in hand, we need to specify the 
problem which picturing in perspective solves. I will make a suggestion on this score at the 
                                                
1 This is a drastically simplified version of David Lewis's much admired account (1969). 
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paper's end. Given some such specification of the problem, the question of perspective's 
status as conventional or otherwise will centre on whether its solution to that problem is 
uniquely advantageous. 
 
Is the question, then, whether perspectival picturing is conventional, in the sense defined? 
Not quite. For the sceptical, conventionalist answer might take a more or a less radical form. 
We have as yet said nothing about picturing in general. Given a specification of the problem 
it solves, we can ask of it too whether it is conventional. The two sceptical positions on 
perspective both hold that picturing in general is a matter of convention. The more radical 
view is that, even given the conventions constituting picturing in general, the further practices 
definitive of perspectival picturing are themselves a matter of convention. The less radical 
position is that, given those general picturing conventions, perspective is not conventional. 
That is, given that more general conventional practice, perspectival systems solve their 
specific problem better than rival solutions. An analogy may help. It is a conventional matter 
which side of the road we drive on. But, given that practice, it is not a matter of convention 
which direction one ought to look before stepping out from the curb. If the problem is that of 
avoiding being run over, the background conventions render one solution better than the 
alternative, and hence not itself conventional. The less radical scepticism about perspective 
sees it as playing a precisely parallel role. We need to phrase our question so as to leave room 
for this sort of view.2 
 
We can thus formulate the question as follows. Is perspectival picturing (a) a matter of 
convention; (b) a non-conventional consequence of those practices, themselves conventional, 
which constitute picturing in general; or (c) neither of the above? As noted above, this 
question is incomplete without specifications of the problems picturing in general and 
                                                
2 Logic leaves room for a fourth position, on which picturing is not conventional, but 
picturing in perspective is so. Although intriguing, this view is not adopted by any writer 
known to me, and is not discussed below. 
 
 
  3 
perspectival picturing in particular are, respectively, intended to solve; and without some 
definition of which are the perspectival drawing systems. I think, however, that it is 
sufficiently clear for discussion to proceed. 
 
 
§2 A Theory of Pictures 
I will answer the question by appeal to a particular account of pictorial representation. That 
account needs more exposition and defence than I can give it here (see Hopkins 1998). If it is 
of interest anyway, that is because it points the way to a compromise between the enthusiastic 
and sceptical positions on perspective. Even if the account is rejected, perhaps some of its 
rivals can adopt the structure of that compromise. The compromise emerges in sections 5 and 
6. §5 shows how the view can accommodate many of the ideas which suggest that 
perspective is a matter of convention. Despite that, §6 explains just what is, on my account, 
special about perspectival picturing, in terms that are, in one respect at least, as strong as any 
enthusiast about perspective could want. But to see how this combination of responses 
emerges, we need first to expound the view. This section does that, and the next two 
elaborate and reject an objection, one particularly salient here. This is that the view seems 
unable to acknowledge the existence of any picturing other than that in perspective. 
 
The account begins from Richard Wollheim's thought (1987 ch.2 §B) that what is distinctive 
about pictorial representation is that it engenders a special kind of visual experience. I follow 
Wollheim in calling this experience "seeing-in". It is a necessary condition on a surface 
depicting something that that thing be seen in the surface. But the condition is only necessary. 
What is further required is that something makes it right to see that thing there. The requisite 
"standard of correctness" is supplied either, in the case of non-photographic pictures, by the 
intentions of the artist, or, in that of photographs, by some special causal relation between the 
marked surface and the thing visible in it. 
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Where I differ from Wollheim is in my account of seeing-in itself. In my view, seeing-in is a 
form of experienced resemblance. To see something in a marked surface is to experience the 
marks as resembling that thing in a certain respect. The immediate problem is to say what this 
respect is, since we might think that the differences between picture and object are at least as 
obvious as any similarities. It's tempting to think that the picture is experienced as resembling 
its object in respect of some shape property. But, given the manifest differences in 3-D shape 
between (most) flat canvasses and what they depict, what can this property be? There is an 
answer to this question. It finds its neatest expression in the work of the eighteenth century 
philosopher Thomas Reid. 
 
Reid distinguishes between two properties, which he dubs "real" and "visible" figure (1764 
ch.VI, §7). The former is just 3-D shape. The latter is in effect the shape things have if we 
ignore the dimension of depth. It is a matter of the directions of various parts of the object 
from the point of view. Thus, if I see a long table stretching away from me, different parts of 
the table lie in different directions from my point of view. For instance, the two distant 
corners lie in directions different from each other, and different from the two directions in 
which lie the nearer corners. The far right hand corner lies to the right of the far left hand 
corner, and above the near right hand corner. And the directions in which lie the two distant 
corners are closer to each other than are the directions of the two nearer ones.3 
 
I make two observations about visible figure. The first is that it is a genuine property of 
things in our environment. For the point of view is just the actual location from which the 
world is seen, and visible figure is simply a matter of the spatial relations in which parts of 
the object stand to that location. This is a complex property determined by the object's 3-D 
shape and orientation to the point of view, but it is distinct from either of these. Reid realized 
                                                
3 Visible figure is what I have elsewhere (Hopkins 1998) called 'outline shape'. 
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this, despite the misleading contrast with "real" figure, for he described visible figure itself as 
"a real and external object to the eye" (1764 ch.VI, §8). 
 
The second observation is that visible figure deserves its name: it is something we see.4 My 
comments about the directions of corners of the table do not merely describe how the world is 
laid out. They also capture how my experience presents that arrangement. I see the directions 
in which the various corners lie, and see, for instance, that opposite points on the table's long 
edges lie in directions ever closer together, the farther away from me they lie. Of course, as 
with any property we perceive, our experience can be misleading, and will always be 
imprecise in certain respects. When a half-submerged stick looks bent we misperceive, not 
just its 3-D shape, but its visible figure too. And no visible figure is perceived with complete 
precision: there is always a degree of specificity beyond which experience neither represents 
the object as having this visible figure or as having that one. Indeed, imprecision is an 
important feature of our perception of this property. For experienced visible figure is only as 
determinate as the point of view it involves, and in general our visual experience presents the 
world not from a point, but from a zone in environmental space large enough, in binocular 
vision, to include the actual location of both eyes.5 But the observation stands: visible figure 
is seen, albeit with varying accuracy and precision. This is just as well. Visible figure can 
hardly be central to making and understanding pictures, those representations so closely 
bound to vision, unless visible figure is something vision makes available. 
 
Reid noted that it is the artist's job "to hunt this fugitive form [i.e. visible figure], and to take 
                                                
4 Do not be misled by Reid's term. It is not part of the notion of visible figure that it is the 
only spatial property, or 'figure', that vision represents. My view is that others, including 3-D 
shape, are also seen. Although Reid disagreed (see Hopkins 2005), this claim is a further, and 
optional, element in his position. 
5 This last is an empirical speculation, but a plausible one. If right, it allows us to dismiss an 
incipient worry. This is that, since we see with two eyes, we cannot see from a single point of 
view, and hence that something is amiss in my claims about the perception of visible figure. 
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a copy of it...." (1764 ch.VI §7). I more or less agree. For it is possible for a picture to 
resemble its object in visible figure, even though they differ considerably in 3-D shape. A 
picture of our table, for instance, might represent the four corners of its top by marks which 
lie in just the same directions from my point of view as did the corners themselves, when I 
stood before the table. The marks lie in the same directions, from the relevant point of view, 
as did the corners, even though, by lying at different distances in those directions, they form a 
configuration very different in 3-D shape from the table itself. But Reid's formulation is not 
quite right. What is crucial for pictorial representation is not actual resemblance in visible 
figure, but that the marks be experienced as resembling the depicted object in this respect. To 
experience this resemblance is to see the object in the picture. And, provided some intention 
or causal connection renders it right to experience the picture in that way, it is the picture's 
sustaining such experiences of resemblance in visible figure which constitutes its depicting 
that thing. Thus we have the basics of an account of picturing. What are the implications of 
this view for our question about perspective? 
 
 
§3 A Challenge – Accommodating the Variety of Pictures 
This issue is best approached through a challenge to the resemblance view. Surely at least 
some perspectival systems are designed precisely to preserve the visible figure of depicted 
objects. Consider Alberti's claim (1966 p.51) that when painters cover a plane with colours, 
 
 "they should only seek to present the form of things seen on this plane as if it were of 
transparent glass. Thus the visual pyramid could pass through it, placed at a definite 
distance with definite lights and a definite position of centre in space and in a definite 
place with respect to the observer." 
 
Isn't this strikingly reminscent of my description of how a picture of the table might preserve 
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its visible figure? The only difference seems to be that talk of the visual pyramid substitutes 
for that of directions from the point of view. Now, whatever Alberti was doing, he was 
attempting to prescribe how pictures should be fashioned. His injunctions presuppose that not 
all pictorial representations are this way, otherwise there would be no point urging that they 
should be. But if pictures fitting his prescriptions preserve visible figure, presumably those 
that don't fit them will not do so. And if these other pictures don't preserve visible figure, how 
can they meet the resemblance view's main condition on their counting as pictorial 
representations, viz. that they be experienced as preserving it? The view purports to be an 
account of picturing per se, but it seems at best to cover a tiny fragment of the pictorial realm, 
picturing in Albertian perspective. 
 
Of course, there are other perspectival drawing systems. Perhaps they, or at least some of 
them, succeed in preserving visible figure too. But this at best goes only a small way towards 
meeting the challenge posed. For even if all picturing in perspective meets the view's 
criterion for pictorial representation, that still leaves all other picturing, quite implausibly, 
excluded.6 In effect, the resemblance view seems to have taken what is true of a subset of 
picturing, a subset at best as large as that of all picturing in perspective, and made it definitive 
of picturing per se. And this leaves it giving implausible answers to the two questions before 
us. To the question "what is pictorial representation?" it gives an implausibly narrow answer, 
in effect one applying only to perspectival picturing. If so, it also gives the wrong answer to 
the question "what is special about picturing in perspective?". For it implies that it is special 
precisely in being the only picturing there is. 
 
To save the resemblance view, we need first to argue that it covers all the rich variety in ways 
of picturing. But, having done that, we need also to find some other account of what is special 
                                                
6 Given this, I need not at this point address the issue, set aside in §1, of which systems are 
the perspectival ones. 
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about pictures in perspective. The next section undertakes the first of these tasks. Since its 
main aim is negative—that the view can evade the current objection—readers more interested 
in my positive assertions about picturing and perspective may choose to skip this section. 
 
 
§4 Meeting the Challenge 
Let us begin by trying to sharpen the challenge. Consider a particular object, say a long table, 
at a particular distance and orientation. The challenge concerns the range of things the 
resemblance view can allow to count as pictures of that thing, at that distance and orientation. 
Only a very limited range of marks will preserve the visible figure of the table when so 
positioned. They might differ in colour, texture and sharpness of line, say, but not in their 
fundamental positions on the surface. Now, it is true that the view does not analyze depiction 
in terms of actual resemblance in visible figure—experienced resemblance is what matters. 
And it is quite possible that picture makers have learned to elicit such experiences even when 
the resemblances themselves are missing. After all, they have done just that for colours, using 
context to ensure that a pigment is seen as the colour of spring foliage, for all that the two are 
really rather different in hue. But there are strict limits on such trickery: a pink pigment 
cannot be seen as resembling one that is lime green, whatever the context. And this is 
because, quite generally, our perception of features of our environment is, while not perfect, 
mostly accurate. If this is true of resemblance in visible figure, there will be relatively little 
slippage between those marks actually preserving visible figure and those experienced as 
doing so. More or less, then, only those marks preserving visible figure will count as 
depicting the table. The challenge to the view is to make room for a wider range of marks, 
counting as depictions of the table, than this. 
 
Showing that the resemblance view can meet this challenge is a complex matter. Here I can 
do no more than sketch some of the ingredients in a full reply. In this section I make three 
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points. All three embody the basic observation that marks depicting the table need not match 
any farther in content than that. 
 
The first point is that not all marks depicting the table need depict it accurately. Some, that is, 
might depict the table as having properties it does not actually enjoy. It is obvious that, in 
general, pictorial misrepresentation is possible. A caricature of Tony Blair need not show his 
nose as being the shape it is, and may indeed distort his features quite drastically, while still 
depicting him. So there is no reason for every picture that depicts our table to show it as the 
shape or colour it really is, or as having the appropriate number of legs. Such 
misrepresentations differ in content from each other and from accurate depictions (save, of 
course, that at least one element is common to the content of all: the table). Now, with respect 
to such groups of pictures, the resemblance view, far from precluding differences in the 
marks composing them, actually expects such. Like any account of depiction, it seeks to say 
what it is for a picture to have its pictorial content. For instance, it will say that for something 
to be a picture of the table as having six legs, a round top, and so forth, is for it to be 
experienced as resembling in visible figure: the table with six legs, a round top, etc.; but that 
to depict the table as round-topped, etc., but with seven legs, the marks must be experienced 
as resembling: the table with seven legs, a round top, and so on. Now, the view does not say 
how the surfaces must be marked to sustain these experiences. But, given the rather limited 
slippage between actual resemblance and experience of it, it will at least be comfortable with 
the idea that different experiences of resemblance will be sustained by differently marked 
surfaces. Here then is one simple way in which marks depicting the table, from the specified 
angle, may differ from one another, so that not all of them preserve the table's actual visible 
figure. 
 
Since the thoughts underlying this move are central to the second point too, it is worth 
spelling them out. Pictures need not be of particular things: a painting can depict a horse 
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without there being any answer to the question which horse it represents. But let us for the 
moment stick to pictures which do depict particulars. In effect, I have said that for these 
pictures the view makes central, not experienced resemblance to the picture's object as it 
actually is, but experienced resemblance to that item with whatever properties it is depicted 
as having. As I have noted, it is in a way obvious that this is how things should be. For only 
thus can the view perform its main job, of stating what it is for a picture to have a given 
pictorial content. For since the content of a picture is always richer than just the 
representation of some particular, and since there is no need for the properties filling out that 
content to be limited to ones the particular actually enjoys, the view must say that what 
matters is that resemblance be experienced to the object with whatever properties the picture 
ascribes. 
 
However, despite this obviousness, discussions of resemblance views have always 
overlooked this point. There are several reasons for this. Some are good reasons, although 
there is no space here to argue that they do not justify rejecting the claims of the last 
paragraph.7 But others are very poor. And amongst the poor reasons is a fixation with the idea 
of perspectival systems as ways of projecting particular objects onto plane surfaces. Thinking 
that this is what perspectival systems do, and thereby thinking of non-perspectival picturing 
as another way, or set of ways, to achieve the same result, makes it especially hard to grasp 
the thought that the test of the resulting marks is experienced resemblance to whatever the 
picture depicts, and not experienced resemblance to the original projected object. Yet in fact 
the notion of a perspectival system, at least in its full generality, has nothing to do with the 
                                                
7 These are (i) that it is assumed the resemblance view is designed to do a job it should not, in 
fact, attempt to do, viz. explaining what it is about the picture which leads people to 
experience it as they do (vide §5); (ii) that it is correctly assumed that the resemblance view 
will want to give some role to how the depicted item actually is, the appropriate role then 
being misunderstood; and (iii) the worry that, if what matters is resemblance to the depicted 
object as depicted, the view takes for granted part of what it is supposed to explain, thereby 
guaranteeing that its its analysis cannot be sufficient. For discussion of these objections, see 
Hopkins 1998. 
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projection of real things. As I noted at the very start, rather than conceiving of perspective in 
this historical way, it is better to think of it as a set of conditions which completed pictures 
may or may not meet. So conceived, perspective can apply, or fail to apply, to pictures 
whether they are of particular objects represented accurately, of particular objects with 
properties they do not in fact enjoy, or not of any particular object at all. If we do not 
conceive of perspectival picturing in this way, it will seem less interesting than it really is. 
For, as noted, pictures in general are not limited to representing particulars nor to 
representing any particulars they do depict as having the properties they actually do. So 
picturing in perspective, if it is conceived as a way of projecting particular objects onto 
surfaces, does not, whatever its other benefits and limitations, offer the same range of 
possible contents, in terms of fundamental logical kinds, as picturing in general does. 
 
This first point begins the process of broadening the range of pictures the view can 
countenance. But it only gets us so far. For misrepresenting pictures too might either be in 
perspective or not. We have seen how very different marks might all depict our table, by 
ascribing different properties to it. But nothing said so far shows how those pictures might be 
other than perspectival. So let me turn to the second point. This is to identify a second way in 
which pictures of the table might differ in content: rather than being inaccurate, their content 
might be imprecise. One might represent the table's shape very precisely, while another 
represents it as merely roughly round. For pictorial content to be imprecise is for there to be 
no answer, beyond a certain level of detail, as to which of two distinct properties the picture 
ascribes to its object.8 
 
It is clear that pictures can have imprecise content. A quick sketch might represent nothing 
more than a figure's rough shape and posture. It should be equally clear that the resemblance 
                                                
8 As I will say, the content is imprecise, and it is indeterminate how things are in the depicted 
realm. 
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view can allow for this feature of depiction. As we saw, what matters is experienced 
resemblance to the object as depicted. There is no reason why marks should not be 
experienced as resembling something with fairly indeterminate properties. But it will help 
meet the challenge to spell out just what such an experience does and does not involve. 
 
What is not required is that the subject misperceive the marks, or only perceive them with 
some rather limited level of precision. I can see a child's drawing as resembling in visible 
figure our table, with the properties the picture ascribes, even if I see the wobbly lines which 
make up the drawing with perfect clarity. Nor is it required that I experience those marks as 
only resembling the (relatively indeterminately characterized) table to a certain degree. 
Above I made no mention of degrees of resemblance in explaining how the view 
accommodates misrepresentation, because there is no need to appeal to that notion. For all I 
said, we experience pictures as resembling their objects, as depicted, perfectly, even when the 
objects as they actually are do not share the marks' visible figure. And the same holds here. I 
may experience the child's wobbly lines as perfectly resembling a table in visible figure, 
provided the table in question is only roughly characterized: eg as more or less cuboid, rather 
longer than it is wide, and so forth. What is required for such experiences is that, while I may 
see the detailed features of the marks, only certain aspects of them are salient in my 
experience of resemblance. It is the rough shape of the line, not its meandering edges, which 
is prominent for me in seeing the resemblance to the table, indeterminately characterized. 
 
How exactly do these observations about imprecise pictorial content help the resemblance 
view respond to the challenge? Different pictures of our table might, without misrepresenting 
it, differ in content from the perspectival representation, by depicting less determinate 
properties. Again, where there is a difference in content our view will predict, rather than 
preclude, that there at least may be a difference in the marks having that content. For, again, 
if two sets of marks are to be experienced as resembling different things, one way to achieve 
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this is for them to differ from one another.9 One might think that these non-perspectival 
pictures succeed in depicting the table only insofar as they approximate to the perspectival 
depiction. But that is quite wrong. They are experienced as resembling a table somewhat 
indeterminately characterized, but there is no sense in which the actual table, with its real 
properties, provides some privileged way of filling in the indeterminacies. If one of them 
depicts the table as roughly cuboid, it matters not what the precise shape of the real table is. 
That is no more relevant to our characterization of the experience of resemblance than any 
other way of filling in the gaps. So there is no sense in which the perspectival picture 
preserves perfectly the visible figure which the other pictures merely roughly preserve. And, 
as noted, there is no room for the thought that the non-perspectival pictures are experienced 
as resembling their objects to some weaker degree than the picture in perspective. So the 
claim of non-perspectival pictures with relatively indeterminate content to depict the table is 
not in any way parasitic on, or less secure than, the claim of the perspectival picture to do so. 
And, given that in different pictures with imprecise content different aspects of the marks 
composing them may be salient, it seems that appeal to such imprecision widens quite 
considerably the range of marks which count as depictions of the table. 
 
The third point develops the theme of imprecision. Thus far I have assumed that, where 
pictorial content is imprecise, so will be the experience determining that content. That is, if 
pictures ascribe relatively indeterminate properties to their objects, that is because they are 
seen as resembling objects with indeterminate properties. But there is another means by 
which pictorial content can be imprecise. Remember that depiction is not merely a matter of 
experienced resemblance to some item. It also requires that some standard of correctness 
renders it right to see the marks as resembling that thing (§2). It is possible for these two 
                                                
9 This is only one way in which this might be achieved since, given the point about salience, 
matching marks might, under the right conditions, differ in content in virtue of different 
aspects of each being salient in the experience of resemblance. Hence the view predicts, not 
that the perspectival and non-perspectival pictures will differ, but that they might. 
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elements in the view to come apart. In general, this merely prevents depiction occurring, as 
when patterns in the frost on a window pane fail, despite being seen as resembling a figure of 
some kind, to depict that, or anything else, since nothing makes it right to see them as 
resembling something (Wollheim 1987). But in certain cases a mismatch between the 
experience of resemblance and the standard of correctness can merely serve to modify 
pictorial content. This occurs when what the standard makes it right to see the picture as 
resembling is less determinate than what it is seen to resemble. An example is provided by 
stick figure pictures. We see these as resembling very thin people, with swollen heads. But, 
although they depict people, they do not depict them as oddly shaped. For, while the drawer's 
intentions make it right to see the resemblance to people, it is not intended that resemblance 
be experienced to emaciated figures. The drawings depict people, but it is simply 
indeterminate, within certain very broad limits, what shape they are. Here, then, pictorial 
content is imprecise in ways in which the content of the experience of resemblance is not. 
 
A relevant instance of indeterminacy attained by these means may be pictures in oriental 
perspective. These preserve their objects' visible figure, but only that visible figure formed at 
a point very distant from, and standardly some distance above, the depicted scene (Hagen 
1986). Thus there is no trouble understanding how these pictures can be seen as resembling 
their objects in visible figure, for all that they do not deploy classical Western perspective. It 
seems to me an open question whether they depict their scenes from the high, distant, 
viewpoint described. But even if they do not, the resemblance view can easily accommodate 
this. The content of the picture is less precise, with respect to viewpoint, than is what is seen 
in it, because what is seen in these marks and what it is right to see therein comes apart in the 
way I have described. 
 
There is more to be said about this second method for generating imprecise content. In 
particular, we need to know how those who see the pictures work out just what is depicted, 
 
 
  15 
i.e. which aspects of their experience to rely upon in interpreting the pictures, and which to 
set aside. I will not go into these matters here (Hopkins 1998 ch.6). My point now is that, 
provided these questions can be answered, this second route to indeterminacy further widens 
the tolerance of the resemblance view. As the case of stick figures illustrates, marks very 
different from those required by perspectival systems can depict, given this latest refinement 
to the view. 
 
I said at the start of this section that my three points would all exploit the possibility that 
different pictures of our table might differ in content. This is true, but the second and third in 
particular also allow us to see how rather different marks might nonetheless exactly match in 
pictorial content. They can do so if only certain aspects of them are salient in determining 
what the marks are seen as resembling. Or they can do so by supporting experiences of 
resemblance to things with different properties, provided only the common aspects of those 
resembled items are underwritten by standards of correctness, and thus retained in the content 
of the pictures. 
 
 
§5 Compromising with the Conventionalist 
The points of the last section go a good way towards meeting the challenge to the 
resemblance view. Marks very different from those preserving our table's visible figure might 
nonetheless depict it, from the right angle, provided they either misrepresent it or represent its 
properties only imprecisely, or, of course, do both. But I promised to do more than merely 
deflect objections. I promised some form of compromise with those who take depiction itself, 
and perspectival picturing in particular, to be either properly conventional, or a non-
conventional consequence of conventions. How does the view yield that compromise? 
 
We can see room for compromise by getting clear about the view's ambitions. It seeks to 
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analyse depiction in terms of the experience to which it gives rise, seeing-in. To do that, it 
needs to tell us what that experience is. It is the experience of resemblance in visible figure. 
But characterizing an experience is not the same thing as describing its causes. So far our 
view has not said much about how the world must be for a given surface to bring a given 
spectator to see a given thing in it. It is not entirely without implications for this question. If 
seeing something in a set of marks is a matter of experiencing them as resembling that thing 
in visible figure, then, given some basic facts of optics and psychology, the only marks that 
will do, except in exceptional circumstances, are ones at least approximating to the object's 
visible figure. And while the last section argued that there is no need for the approximation to 
be very exact, it does not follow that it need not hold at all.10 But the causal condition thus 
stated is at best necessary. Many other factors will come into play in dictating whether a 
given experience of resemblance in fact occurs. Saying what these factors are is no part of the 
brief of our position. Its goal is to analyse seeing in, and thereby pictorial representation, not 
to describe the empirical facts about quite when that experience is engendered. However, the 
view can at least acknowledge these facts. It is here that the seeds of compromise can be 
found. For the view can allow that many of the factors empirically determining a given 
experience of resemblance are precisely those which the sceptic about perspective wished to 
emphasize. I offer three examples. 
 
The first factor is the nature of the spectator's general perceptual environment. We can see 
that this must play a role in determining what folk see in surfaces by better understanding 
why that can't be determined by preservation of visible figure alone. The problem is that a 
given visible figure is compatible with an infinite range of 3-D shapes.11 The attraction of 
                                                
10 In §4 I said that the view makes no appeal to (experienced) degrees of resemblance in 
characterizing seeing-in. Indeed, the notion of degrees of resemblance does not figure in any 
of the claims that constitute the view. It is quite consistent with this that the view, coupled 
with some basic optics and physiology, has implications involving (actual) degrees of 
resemblance. 
11 Strictly, the relevant range is of different pairings of 3-D shape and orientation. 
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placing visible figure at the core of an account of picturing is precisely that objects of 
different shape, and in particular pictures and what they depict, might share visible figure. 
They need only be arranged differently, that is at different distances, along the same set of 
directions from a given point. But by the same token any other arrangement differing from 
these two only in respect of depth will likewise share that visible figure. So the fact that a 
picture preserves the visible figure of a particular 3-D shape cannot alone determine what is 
seen in it. For we might equally see therein one of the many other shapes the visible figure of 
which is thus preserved. 
 
What then does determine which of the infinitely many compatible 3-D shapes we experience 
a given set of marks as resembling in visible figure? In part, the answer is surely our general 
perceptual environment. We see cubes in pictures of them, rather than irregular 
trapezohedrons, because our world contains far more of the former than the latter. Such 
examples may seem to offer little comfort to the sceptical, conventionalist, cast of mind. For 
these folk want to stress the variation across cultures in the reception and use of perspective; 
whereas many of the environmental features the role of which we are now describing will be 
common to all cultures. But the structure of the issue here is more general. Lots of people 
look more or less alike, some very much so. What determines that people see some of these 
lookalikes rather than others in their portraits and holiday snaps? Not resemblance in visible 
figure, since what so resembles one lookalike will equally resemble all. So the answer must 
lie in past perceptual experience: the folk have seen one lookalike, but had no contact with 
the other. Here there is variation across different groups of people of just the sort the sceptic 
seeks to highlight. The resemblance view can acknowledge the role of that variation, not by 
offering a conventionalist account of depiction, but by allowing the variation a role in the 
causal determinants of seeing-in. 
 
The second factor I want to discuss is closer to the sceptic's heart. This is the spectator's 
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pictorial education. It is a matter of the sorts of pictures to which he has been exposed and the 
ways in which those have affected his perceptual sensitivities. Although few have realized 
this, the resemblance view is easily able to acknowledge the role such factors play. As Reid 
noted, visible figure is "fugitive", that is, it is hard to perceive with precision and accuracy. 
The less sharp one's perceptual grasp of it, the less sensitive one will be to a picture's failure 
to preserve it. In consequence, many non-perspectival pictures may well have been 
experienced as resembling their objects in visible figure perfectly well, for all that they don't 
in fact resemble them more than approximately. For they may have been intended for, and 
enjoyed by, viewers whose perception of visible figure was less than ideally acute. And one 
result of the rediscovery of perspective may have been to sharpen viewers' ability to perceive 
visible figure, thereby altering which marks will be experienced as resembling things in that 
respect. 
 
Here the compromise with the sceptic is considerable. Our view allows that picturing 
essentially involves something independent of conventions, the generation of a particular 
experience, but allows that certain pictures may themselves alter which pictures are 
experienced in that way. The suggestion is that perspectival pictures may be one such case, 
altering viewers' general perceptual propensities so as to bolster their own position as the 
marked surfaces most likely to elicit the required experiential response. The point can be 
illustrated by tackling an argument of Goodman's, one intended precisely as an objection to 
perspective's special status. 
 
One of Goodman's points against perspective was, in effect, that not even pictures in 
Albertian perspective preserve visible figure (1969 ch.1). The Albertian system requires 
receding horizontal parallels to be represented by converging lines, but not so parallels 
receding in the vertical plane. As Goodman observed, this is not true to the geometry. The 
difference between the directions of opposing points on the parallels narrows just as rapidly 
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with recession in the vertical plane as in the horizontal. What Goodman overlooked, however, 
is that this discrepancy may reflect an aspect of our experience of visible figure. Setting aside 
pictures for a moment, consider our face-to-face experience of things. Suppose that in such 
experience we are more sensitive to this shift in the direction of points on receding parallels 
when the recession is horizontal, as along railway tracks, than when it is vertical, as with the 
sides of a building viewed from the street. Then we would expect pictures which are 
experienced as preserving visible figure to exhibit precisely the discrepancy noted. 
Systematic discrepancies in our face-to-face experience of visible figure will dictate 
analogous discrepancies in our depictive practices. This provides a response to Goodman's 
objection, but it also suggests another point more relevant to present purposes. For it may be 
that our differing sensitivities to vertical and horizontal recession is as much effect as cause 
of the Albertian system. Perhaps the prevalence of picturing in Albertianian perspective has 
sharpened our perception of one of these aspects of visible figure over the other.  
 
Of course, it is only a supposition that there are the systematic discrepancies in experience 
described above. And it is only an hypothesis that any such discrepancies might be fed by, as 
much as support, the pictorial systems we have adopted. These claims need testing 
empirically. But they can serve my purposes prior to such investigation. For the supposition 
alone is enough to neutralize Goodman's objection to perspective's privileged status, pending 
further investigation. And the hypothesis serves to illustrate that, to the extent that the sceptic 
is right to think that acculturation affects which pictures look natural or right to us, the truth 
in such claims is quite consistent with the resemblance view. For the hypothesis, produced 
within the framework of that view, is that a perspectival system has altered our perceptions in 
such a way as to ensure its own entrenchment as a way of generating pictures which look 
right. Suspicion that perspective's success is down to such bootstrapping is surely one of the 
motors of scepticism about it. 
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The third factor determining experiences of resemblance is another which might vary across 
cultures. This is the way in which we view pictures. Once again, we can approach the point 
via a potential objection to perspectival picturing's special status. 
 
In Raphael's The School of Athens a figure on the far right holds a sphere, resting on the 
fingertips of his upturned hand. The sphere is depicted by a mark which is circular. However, 
classical perspectival systems suggest that, thanks to its oblique position away from the 
vanishing point of the picture, the sphere should be represented by an elliptical patch of paint. 
This preserves the visible figure a sphere would have at the single, highly precise, point in 
depicted space from which the entire scene might be viewed, and from which Raphael depicts 
the scene. In the nineteenth century, La Gournerie tried substituting, on an engraving of The 
School, an ellipse for Raphael's circle. However, the effect looked quite wrong, whereas 
Raphael's circle looks exactly right. The reason is, once again, that actual resemblance in 
visible figure is no guarantee of experienced resemblance therein. What determines the 
discrepancy here? The answer is that the way we view pictures affects which marks we see as 
resembling others in visible figure. Were we to view the Raphael from the point, in front of 
the marked surface, at which it exactly matches the visible figure, at the pictorial point of 
view, of the depicted scene; and were we to view it from there with one eye; then the 
elliptical patch would look right. That is, it would be seen as resembling an off-centre sphere 
in visible figure. But we don't normally look at pictures in that way. We move about, 
positioning ourselves at different distances from the marked surface, and at different points 
along its length. We use both eyes. We let our impressions build over time. All these factors 
dictate that the circular patch is the one we see as resembling a spherical, off-centre ball; and 
thus that such a patch is what depicts the ball. Things would be different were we the sort of 
viewers, with different habits of attending to pictures, which La Gournerie's unduly rigid 
application of perspective supposed us to be. Then an elliptical patch would carry the content 
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of our circular one.12 
 
§6 What is Special About Perspective? 
The last section tried to show that the resemblance view can accommodate some of the 
factors which have impressed those sceptical about perspective's special status. Section 4 
argued that it is in no way obliged to restrict depiction to picturing in perspective. This leaves 
one issue outstanding. We need to say what is special about perspectival picturing, according 
to the resemblance view. If it's not the only picturing there is, and if the truth about both 
depiction in general and perspectival depiction in particular leaves room for at least some of 
the culturally relative factors the sceptic emphasizes, then how should we answer the question 
with which we began? Is perspectival picturing conventional, or a consequence of 
conventions? And if not, what is the problem that it solves better than any rivals? 
 
Perspectival picturing is not a consequence of conventions, for picturing itself is not 
conventional. Pictorial representation essentially involves the generation of a certain 
experience, one of resemblance in visible figure. Generating this experience, in such a way as 
to effect communication, is the problem which methods of picturing have to solve. More 
precisely, in any particular case the problem is so to mark a surface such that it can be seen as 
resembling, in visible figure, a certain thing or scene, with certain properties, from a certain 
angle. Given our account of convention (§1), picturing will be conventional just if there are 
two or more equally good solutions to each such problem, the choice between them being 
made on the basis that others have also chosen likewise, it also being common knowledge 
that this is what is going on. There are three reasons why this condition is not met. 
 
                                                
12 For La Gournerie's experiment, see Pirenne 1970 p.122. His engraving seems certain to 
have been far smaller than Raphael's original. This complicates the relationship between the 
story and the moral I want to draw from it. However, I think it obvious that the outcome 
would have been the same had La Gournerie tampered with the Raphael itself, so I ignore this 
complication here. 
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First, the range of possible marks in which the target content can be seen is narrowly 
constrained. For, despite all the concessions made above, it remains the case that in general a 
causally necessary condition is that the marks preserve, at least roughly, the relevant visible 
figure (§5). This excludes most of the possible ways of marking the surface from being 
solutions to the problem in hand. 
 
Now, those concessions were real. I allowed that other factors do play a role in determining 
experiences of resemblance, factors other than the marks' actually reproducing the visible 
figure of the target scene. Nonetheless, none of these factors plays the role convention would 
require. For—the second reason—they are not in general factors under the control of a given 
group of picture makers or consumers. This is clearly true for the general nature of the 
perceptual environment. We can control the nature of what others or ourselves are in 
perceptual contact with, but only under very special circumstances (eg persuading someone 
to take part in a psychological experiment), and over very limited portions of space and time. 
The sort of very limited context over which we thus exercise control plays a highly restricted 
role in conditioning pictorial perception, compared with the subject's perceptual life history. 
The point also holds for pictorial acculturation. No doubt for any pictorial education a viewer 
has had, there is a different one he might have undergone. But it does not follow that either 
he, or any picture maker currently attempting to communicate with him, could have chosen to 
give him the one rather than the other. It is a matter of the history of his culture, and his own 
exposure, over many years, to various images. And something similar is at least in part true 
of our habits of viewing pictures. One can, by prescription or by constricting the viewer's 
movement, in exceptional circumstances limit the ways in which the picture is viewed. But 
even here many of the key factors, such as the tendency to deploy eye- and head-movement, 
reflect engrained perceptual habits, and even basic facts about visual physiology, which 
cannot be swept aside, however determined we are to find a new way of doing things. 
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Perhaps these considerations do not exclude every relevant possibility. Perhaps they leave 
some room at the margins, by manipulating the factors discussed, for alternative means to the 
same experiential end. But, and this is my third reason, even if this is true, it is not common 
knowledge that it is. Different viewing habits, for instance, may affect what people see a set 
of marks as resembling, but those people are not aware that this is so. This will prevent them 
from knowing that what they are responding to is one of two equally good solutions to a 
given pictorial problem. And thus, insofar as the factors of §5 meet the control condition for 
conventionality, they do not meet the common knowledge condition. Picturing, it seems, is 
not conventional. 
 
Nor is it the case that perspectival picturing is conventional. It might seem that my attempt to 
defuse the objection that the resemblance view is hopelessly narrow forces just this result. 
For if perspectival picturing is not the only sort there is, and if the problem solved by all 
pictorial systems is just that of generating experiences of resemblance to certain things, it 
may seem that there is nothing left for perspective systems to do better than their rivals. If 
not, we would have in place at least part of what is required for their adoption to be a matter 
of convention. But this line is mistaken. There is something perspective systems do which 
others don't. They are not the only pictures, but they do constitute the only way to depict a 
certain kind of thing. For only pictures in perspective depict detailed spatial content. Or so at 
least I will argue. 
 
I cannot derive this conclusion from the resemblance view alone. However, the only extra 
needed is a little theoretical reflection, and some plausible psychological speculation. Given 
these, although non-perspectival pictures might depict spatial detail, it seems that they do not 
in fact do so. Moreover, quite a lot would have to change before they would do. 
 
The theoretical reflection is this. Consider properties which admit of ordered variation. 
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Colours are one example—there are many shades between pure green and pure blue. Spatial 
properties are another—my hand can occupy many positions between my two feet. One can 
represent such properties, of course, in more or less precise ways—merely specifying rough 
hues, or locations; or specifying more determinate ones. Now, some forms of representation 
allow one to represent instances of these properties in a highy precise but piecemeal way. 
One could, for instance, have a word for a particular shade of blue, without having words for 
any but the roughest categories of the other colours. But depiction is not a form of 
representation which allows for this possibility. If you can depict an instance of some colour, 
at a certain level of precision, your representational resources must also allow you to depict 
other colours, with equal precision. And likewise for spatial properties.13 
 
Coupled to the resemblance view, this thought promises to ensure that only pictures in 
perspective can depict precise spatial properties. For suppose we consider a competing 
system—so called 'inverse perspective'. In pictures drawn on these principles, receding 
parallel lines in pictorial space are represented by lines on the canvas which diverge, in sharp 
contrast to perspectival systems, in which such lines converge. Thus, since perspectival 
systems preserve visible figure, inverse perspective cannot do so. Now, despite that, there is 
no reason to deny that inverse perspective yields depictions. For an inverse perspective 
drawing of an oblong table may indeed be seen as resembling, in visible figure, an oblong 
table. But this is only obviously possible if the object the picture is experienced as resembling 
is reasonably indeterminate—a table which is roughly oblong, no more. So let us consider 
under what conditions, if any, such a system would yield depictions of precise shape and 
other spatial features. They must be conditions allowing for the depiction of any of a wide 
variety of such shapes and arrays, or so our theoretical reflection suggests. So the rules of 
                                                
13 This thought is really the offspring of Goodman's (1969) account of depiction. It ignores 
some of the difficulties of his view by restricting itself to certain sorts of property and by 
resisting the temptation to insist on infinitely precise representation. But the most significant 
difference is that I do not offer it as a definition of depiction, more a test for it. For another 
use of a similar thought, see Lopes 1996. 
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inverse perspective will have to allow for projecting a wide variety of such shapes/arrays onto 
surfaces. But if we are to appreciate the detailed content of the pictures thus created, it seems 
we must be sensitive to small differences between the way a given canvas is marked, and the 
ways in which it might have been. Now, those differences are precisely between marks which 
do not preserve the visible figure of what they represent, and their not doing so is important 
to their representing, according to the rules of inverse perspective, what they do. So an 
appropriate sensitivity to the relevant details of the surface markings cannot, in all 
psychological plausibility, accompany experiencing the marks as resembling, in visible 
figure, something with the precise spatial features in question. Thus, while the marks may 
depict something, and while they may systematically represent spatial detail, they do not 
depict that detail. The only conditions under which they would do so would be ones in which 
our psychology was quite different from how it in fact is. 
 
Of course, inverse perspective fails in a radical way to preserve visible figure. However, any 
other way of marking surfaces which fails less spectacularly will also confront the basic 
problem here. So the resemblance view, coupled to our theoretical constraint on depiction 
and our sense of what is psychologically possible for us, does seem to preclude any depiction 
of spatial detail that is not depiction in perspective. If this conclusion seems outrageous, 
remember that it is restricted to a certain, highly special, form of pictorial content. Once one 
focusses that thought clearly, I think the conclusion loses its air of reductio, and starts to 
seem plausible. At least it allows us to say what is special about drawing in perspective. The 
Renaissance did not invent depiction, but it did discover a way to expand our depictive 
powers. For only with the articulation of perspectival drawing systems did we acquire the 
ability to depict space with precision.14 
 
                                                
14 John Hyman (1992) has reached somewhat similar conclusions independently. It might be 
fairer to consider the Renaissance achievement one of rediscovery. See, for instance, White 
1987. 
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One issue remains. Which systems are the perspectival ones? I am not sure what to say about 
this. If the speculations just offered are correct, we could pick them out as those systems 
permitting depiction of spatial detail. The cost of doing this, however, would be to trivialise 
my claim that perspective is not a matter of convention. For I made good that claim by saying 
that no rivals can solve the problem of depicting spatial detail, an assertion the proposed 
characterization would empty of content. What is needed, therefore, is a way of picking out 
the perspectival systems which renders my speculation plausible without trivializing it. I am 
not sure what, other than a list of particular systems, would do this. But I am also not sure 
that this is a particularly a problem for the position articulated here. I suspect that everyone 
who wants to talk clearly about whether perspectival systems have a special status will have 
to define which systems they mean, and to say, in independent terms, which problem those 
systems are intended to solve. Although this paper has not managed the first of those tasks, it 
has at least made an attempt at the second. 
 
 
Robert Hopkins 
University of Sheffield 
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